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AbstrAct: While the terrorism studies literature speaks of a shape of terrorism unique to 
modernity, the exact nature of modern terrorism, let alone the nature of modernity or its 
starting point, remain much in dispute. in this article we suggest that the confusion and 
conflict within the literature arises from a tendency to focus on certain outward or inessential 
features associated with modernity. in order to truly answer the question of what makes 
modern terrorism modern, the question needs to be set on a new footing, one which inquires 
into the necessary and not instrumental relationship between modernity and terrorism—i.e., 
that inquires into the possibility of an inner dynamic which can take us from the nature of 
modernity itself to terrorism. in this article we suggest that the intellectual resources for an 
understanding of modern terrorism in the fullest sense can be found within the preeminent 
nineteenth-century philosopher of the birth of the modern, g.W.f. hegel. More specifically, 
through a reconstruction of hegel’s account of the french revolution we can uncover the 
possibility of understanding modern terrorism as an ontological rather than a temporal 
category. in other words, we can uncover resources that help us grasp what modern terrorism 
is, rather than in what age—with its instrumental possibilities given by, say, technology 
or ideology—it is found. What makes modern terrorism truly modern, we will argue, is a 
particular shape of self-consciousness that, hegel shows us, stands as the deep structure of 
early modernity, and which contains within it an inner dynamic towards a uniquely modern 
shape of terrorism. While all terrorism that occurs within modernity is not modern, a truly 
modern terrorism can be identified.
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i. inTrOducTiOn
While the terrorism studies literature speaks of a shape of terrorism unique to moder-
nity, the exact nature of modern terrorism, let alone the nature of modernity or its 
starting point, remain much in dispute. in this article we suggest that the confusion 
and conflict within the literature arises from a tendency to focus on certain outward 
or inessential features associated with modernity. in order to answer the question of 
what makes modern terrorism truly modern, the question needs to be set on a new 
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footing, one the inquires into the necessary and not instrumental relationship between 
modernity and terrorism—i.e., that inquires into the possibility of an inner dynamic 
which can take us from the nature of modernity itself to terrorism. in this article we 
suggest that the intellectual resources for an understanding of modern terrorism in 
the fullest sense can be found within the preeminent nineteenth-century philosopher 
of the birth of the modern, g.W.f. hegel. More specifically, through a reconstruction 
of hegel’s account of the french revolution we can uncover the possibility of under-
standing modern terrorism as an ontological rather than a temporal category. in other 
words, we can uncover resources that help us grasp what modern terrorism is, rather 
than in what age—with its instrumental possibilities given by, say, technology or ide-
ology—it is found. What makes modern terrorism truly modern, we will argue, is a 
particular shape of self-consciousness that, hegel shows us, stands as the deep struc-
ture of early modernity, and which contains within it an inner dynamic towards a 
uniquely modern shape of terrorism. While all terrorism that occurs within modernity 
is not modern, a truly modern terrorism can be identified.
The argument of this article moves through five sections: Part ii examines attempts 
by the terrorism literature to locate and conceptualize the relationship between ter-
rorism and modernity; Part iii begins our turn to hegel’s account of modernity and 
terrorism, by exploring his attempt to locate the nature of modernity; Parts iV and V 
comprise the heart of our analysis of hegel’s account of the french revolution, and the 
relationship between a uniquely modern logic of identity, community, and the dynamic 
of terroristic violence that necessarily emerges from it; and, finally, Part Vi concludes 
with the implications of our analysis for the terrorism literature.
ii. The QuesTiOn Of MOderniTy and TerrOrisM WiThin  
TerrOrisM sTudies
if we wish to understand the nature of modern terrorism as something truly or onto-
logically bound up—and not something merely chronologically associated—with the 
modern era however understood, we suggest that the intellectual resources to do so 
can be found in hegel’s account of the french revolution in his notoriously difficult 
Phenomenology of  Spirit, published in 1806 and his later Philosophy of  Right, published in 
1821.1 yet, is such a turn to hegel even necessary? in sec. a we show that the terror-
ism studies literature focuses on a variety of features, including ones associated with 
the french revolution, as important to an understanding of the relationship between 
modernity and terrorism as hegel also does, however, as we will see in sec. B, this lit-
erature in general provides no adequate way to move from the identification of this 
plurality of facts associated with modern terrorism to why such terrorism might be nec-
essarily modern.
     1. g.W.f. hegel, Phenomenology of  Spirit, trans. a.V. Miller, new york, Oxford university Press, 1977; all 
citations are by paragraph number. g.W.f. hegel, Elements of  the Philosophy of  Right, allen W. Wood (ed.), 
trans. h.B. nisbet, new york, cambridge university Press, 1996; citations are to section number, except in 
the Preface where only page numbers are given.
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A. The French Revolution and Historicizing Terrorism
Many studies of terrorism begin discussion of the concept with the french revolution, 
or even with a later event. Weinberg argues that the revolution had the effect of provid-
ing an ideal for subsequent revolutionaries to pursue and a model for using tyrannicide 
as a means of removing repressive leaders.2 as terrorism increasingly came to be seen 
as an action perpetrated against the state, starting studies of the phenomenon with the 
revolution makes some logical sense. Moreover, the etymology of ‘terrorism’, as a term, 
is traceable to 1793–94’s régime de la terreur. as has been widely noted, however, in this 
context, terrorism was the system by which the revolutionary government protected 
the new state against ‘enemies of the people’, counterrevolutionaries and other internal 
threats. The mainstream, present, view of terrorism as revolutionary or antigovern-
mental violence conducted predominantly against the state by substate actors, is a more 
recent evolution of the term.3
The french revolution also marks the point at which accusations of terrorism are 
first used to delegitimize and discredit political opponents, through demonization and 
exaggerated accounts of the atrocities committed by the revolutionaries. Messer shows 
that edmund Burke ‘sought to discredit the revolutionaries’ policies and principles by 
portraying them as enemies of humanity—inhuman brutes who abandoned reason and 
politics in favor of destruction and terror’. since Burke was writing Reflections on the Revo-
lution in France during the early phases of the revolution in 1790, rather than during the 
much more lethal Terror of 1793–94, his description of mass violence owed as much to 
his reactionary political inclinations as to events occurring in france.4 narratives treat-
ing terrorism as an innately pejorative term and its perpetrators as inherently illegitimate 
actors continue to the present. The french revolution becomes the start of modern ter-
rorism and at the same moment it begins a modern dialogue of counter-terrorism.
While hoffman and others have shown that the term ‘terrorism’ can be traced to a 
specific time and place in history, as laqueur suggests, ‘there have been terrorists (and 
terrorism movements) avant la lettre’.5 however, laqueur’s examples of such violence 
before the french revolution focus on religious motivations, notably the three ancient 
groups (Zealot-sicariis, assassins, Thugees) highlighted by rapoport.6 Others have fo-
cused primarily on tyrannicide as a form of proto-terrorism.7 if pre-french revolution 
     2. leonard Weinberg, Global Terrorism: A Beginner’s Guide, Oxford, OneWorld, 2005, pp. 22-23. laqueur has 
shown how the revolutionaries of russia in the 1880s found inspiration in the Terror and the actions of st 
Just, robespierre and others. Walter laqueur, The Age of  Terrorism, new york, little, Brown, 1987, pp. 25-26.
     3. cindy c. combs, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, upper saddle river, nJ, Prentice hall, 1997, p. 24. 
Bruce hoffman, Inside Terrorism, new york, columbia university Press, 2006, 2nd ed., p. 3.
     4. Peter c. Messer, ‘feel the Terror: edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France’, in isaac land (ed.), 
Enemies of  Humanity: The Nineteenth Century War on Terrorism, new york, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp. 23-44.
     5. laqueur, The Age of  Terrorism, p. 12.
     6. david c. rapoport, ‘fear and Trembling in Three religious Traditions,’ American Political Science Review, 
vol. 78, no. 3, 1984, p. 658-677.
     7. Weinberg, Global Terrorism, p. 22; combs, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, pp. 20-24; Martin Miller, 
‘The intellectual Origins of Modern Terrorism in europe’ in Martha crenshaw (ed.) Terrorism in Context, 
university Park, Pennsylvania state university Press, 1995, p. 29.
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terrorism is characterized as being largely motivated by religion or limited to some form 
of assassination, then the revolution would represent a significant shift from anything 
that preceded it, being both overtly secular and more widespread than the earlier non-
religious violence. chaliand and Blin have noted that key french revolutionaries under-
stood that executing a single tyrant might not end a tyranny.8 Therefore they engaged in 
a systematic intimidation of the enemy that although initially spontaneous and instinc-
tive, was latterly bureaucratic and doctrinaire.9 This systemic intimidation had ‘the goal 
not only of changing the political regime, but also transforming society’,10 and in adopting 
such methods, they were followed by subsequent revolutionaries in different countries.
duyvesteyn has critiqued this standard historical account within the literature of 
terrorism in the nineteenth century. she suggests that such discussions focus on ele-
ments that supposedly distinguish political violence in that century from the violence 
which preceded it. first, she identifies the growth of secret societies, most notably the 
carbonari sects from the early nineteenth century, consisting of like-minded individu-
als dedicated to using violence to attain political objectives, but suggests that this can be 
seen as little more than a variation in the age-old use of conspiracy to attain such goals. 
second, she notes the theoretical changes that allegedly permitted terrorism to be used 
to achieve such political ends—most notably, the works of Karl heinzen and Johann 
Most justified murder as the most effective means to make such gains. duyvesteyn makes 
two points here. first, she asks whether the rise of secular justifications for murder really 
offer a substantially different account of what is permissible from the religious justifica-
tions of earlier ages and, even if it does so, how radical a break from precedence such 
justification provide, given that earlier secular justifications exist in the early sixteenth 
century work of niccolò Machiavelli? duyvesteyn’s second point relates to technology, 
a central factor of some of the accounts discussed below.11 Miller similarly questions the 
unique contribution of changes in technology and justifications for terrorism associated 
with the revolution, he nonetheless suggests that the french revolution matters to the 
history of terrorism because it represents a crucial shift in the targets of violence ‘[d]is-
crete objects of violence now were transformed into indiscriminate subjects of violence’ 
and in doing so’, political violence became the province of virtually undifferentiated sub-
jects who were simultaneously its potential victims, replacing the discrete objects of the 
past, and its perpetrators’.12
in this brief survey, we see that the dominant lines of thought within the terrorism 
literature locate the importance of the french revolution as an instance of modern ter-
rorism because, variously, of the way it introduces new objects of violence, utilizes new 
     8. gérard chaliand and arnaud Blin, ‘Manifestations of Terror Through the ages’ in gérard chaliand 
and arnaud Blin (eds.), The History of  Terrorism From Antiquity to Al Qaeda, Berkeley, university of california 
Press, 2007, p. 84.
     9. laqueur, The Age of  Terrorism, p. 26.
     10. chaliand and Blin, ‘Manifestations of Terror Through the ages’, p. 84.
     11. isabelle duyvesteyn, ‘The role of history and continuity in Terrorism research’ in Magnus ranstorp 
(ed.), Mapping Terrorism Research: State of  the Art, Gaps and Future Direction, london, routledge, 2007, pp. 56-57.
     12. Miller, ‘Modern Terrorism in europe’, p. 31.
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technologies, as well as new motivations and justifications for violence that empirically 
differ from earlier modes of violence, even that characterized as terroristic. however, 
the identification of the fact of this new mode of terrorism is not the same as an expla-
nation of why modernity itself makes it so. at this point, then, we must move from the 
‘that it is so’ (terrorism in the modern age seems different because of this or that feature) 
to ‘why it is so’. 
an awareness of this need to shift from the whole complex of facts associated with 
terrorism in modernity (objects, technologies, motivations)—what we might call the 
‘playing field’ of modernity—to a larger account which can explain the animating orien-
tation to that whole complex of facts—what we might call the ‘game’ that is played—is 
not absent from the terrorism literature. for example, we see gueniffey suggesting that 
‘The Terror was neither a product of ideology nor a reaction to circumstance. it is at-
tributable neither to the rights of man, nor to the plotting of the coblenz émigrés, nor 
even to the Jacobin utopia of virtue. it was the product of the revolutionary dynamic, 
as it would be, perhaps, of all revolutionary dynamics. in that, it arose from the very 
nature of the revolution, of all revolution’.13 as well, we find duyvesteyn rhetorically 
asking ‘is it fair to ascribe […] a revolutionary effect only on the phenomenon of ter-
rorism? To what extent can societal developments and changes in the practice of terror-
ism be separated?’14 These attempts by gueniffey and duyvesteyn point us in the right 
direction, because they point to an attempt to explain the inner necessity (located in 
the nature of revolution or society development) that generates terrorism rather than is 
simply used by it. here, then, to understand what is modern in terrorism (and there may 
be all sorts of terrorism which are not modern) is to locate that uniquely modern inner 
dynamic towards terrorism.
B. Terrorism and Modernity
The issue of when the modern era of terrorism begins is disputed, in part because 
the most salient features of modernity are also disputed within the terrorism literature. 
rapoport has provided a vision of such terrorism as having four waves, starting with an-
archist terror in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, followed by anti-colo-
nial violence from the 1920s to the 1960s, leftist terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s and fi-
nally religiously motivated terrorism from the 1980s onwards.15 he argues that ‘Modern 
terror began in russia in the 1880s and within a decade appeared in Western europe, 
the Balkans, and asia’.16 rapoport notes two key changes which permitted the russian 
anarchists to engage in violence unlike anything that had preceded it. first, communi-
cation and transportation changed rapidly in the last decades of the nineteenth century, 
     13. Patrice gueniffey, La politique de la Terreur: Essai sur la violence révolutionnaire, cited in chaliand and Blin, 
The History of  Terrorism, p. 99.
     14. duyvesteyn, ‘The role of history and continuity in Terrorism research’, pp. 56-57.
     15. david rapoport, ‘The four Waves of Modern Terrorism’ in audrey cronin and James ludes (eds.), 
Attacking Terrorism: Elements of  a Grand strategy, Washington dc, georgetown university Press, 2004, pp. 46-73.
     16. ibid, p. 47.
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dramatically altering the constraints of geography. Telegraphs, railways and mass news-
papers all meant that events could become widely known, only days after they had oc-
curred. furthermore, members of the russian group, narodnaya Volya (The People’s 
Will), were able to travel widely, disseminating their message. rapoport argues that the 
second critical change was the development of a particular doctrine or culture or strat-
egy of terror that others might emulate and improve upon. he cites Max Weber’s asser-
tion that the desire to make an activity efficient and to rationalize it is a central feature 
of modern life.17 yet while these changes in technology and the presence of a strategy of 
terror may allow for the efficient and violent instrumentalization and dissemination of 
terror, the purpose for which this instrumentalization is done is given by a deeper shared 
motivation or total self-conception: anarchist, nationalist, leftist, and religious. implic-
itly in rapoport’s account, changes in self-conception constitute the boundary posts, 
marking the transition from one wave to the next. disputes about these boundaries are, 
likewise, disputes about the relevant animating self-conception, as for example in sedg-
wick’s reworking of rapoport’s typology.18
One of rapoport’s goals in historicizing terror in this way was to demonstrate that 
any accounts of modern terrorism that began only in the late 1960s, and certainly only 
on september 11, 2001, were flawed accounts of the phenomenon. The argument that 
‘modern, international terrorism’ began in July 1968 is best articulated by hoffman. 
he is certainly not suggesting that terrorism began in the 1960s or 1970s, but he does 
make a case for 1968—when members of the Popular front for the liberation of Pal-
estine hijacked an el-al plane en route between rome and Tel aviv—as being seen as 
the start of the type of terrorism that has dominated through to the present. for hoff-
man, with this attack
the nature and character of terrorism demonstrably changed. for the first 
time, terrorists began to travel regularly from one country to another to carry 
out attacks. in addition, they also began to target innocent civilians from other 
countries […] simply in order to endow their acts with the power to attract 
attention and publicity that attacks against their declared or avowed enemies 
often lacked. Their intent was to shock and, by shocking, to stimulate worldwide 
fear and alarm. These dramatic tactical changes in terrorism were facilitated 
by the technological advances of the time that had transformed the speed and 
ease of international commercial air travel and vastly improved both the quality 
of television new footage and the promptness with which that footage could be 
broadcast around the globe.19
     17. ibid, pp. 48-49, 65.
     18. sedgwick suggested recategorizing the waves as italians (nineteenth and early twentith century 
revolutionary groups, including the russians and anarchists with which rapoport begins his account, 
inspired by the risorgimento), germans (reactionary groups inspired by the sa during the 1920s and 1930s), 
chinese (groups, including those with anti-colonial or left-wing revolutionary objectives from the 1950s to 
1970s, that were inspired by the Maoist triumph in the chinese civil war), and afghans (islamist-nationalist 
groups, operating from the late 1970s onwards and inspired by the mujahidin). Mark sedgwick, ‘inspiration 
and Origins of global Waves of Terrorism’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 30, no. 2,  2007, pp. 97-112.
     19. hoffman, Inside Terrorism, pp. 63-64.
cOsMOs and hisTOry66
rapoport’s and hoffman’s accounts seem at odds if we focus only on the question of 
where modern terrorism begins. however, if our purpose is to ask how we might theo-
rize the inner relationship between modernity and terrorism, we can notice impor-
tant and complimentary insights into the relationship between modernity and violence. 
Both emphasize that the shape of modern violence becomes comprehensible not only 
by understanding the technological possibilities associated with modernity, but more 
importantly by understanding a particular conception of consciousness or shared self-
understanding that takes advantages of these technologies in unique ways. When taken 
together, rapoport’s and hoffman’s accounts mark out the range of phenomena that 
must be included in any attempt to locate the inner necessity of truly modern terror-
ism. from rapoport, we see that such a unified account must include the general self-
consciousness or ‘energy’ that provides the broad motivations and purposes—i.e., strat-
egies—for the violent instrumentalization of technology. from hoffman, we see that 
whatever other factors we identify, they must be able to account for, out of itself, why 
violence at all and why violence in its specific shape. Without the broad self-conscious-
ness rooted in the age, there is no ontologically modern self-understanding to provide 
motivations and justifications that characterize modern terrorism. Without the link-
ing of the tactics of violence to a modern self-consciousness, there is no ontologically 
modern terrorism. so, if we cannot discover a broad account of modern self-conscious-
ness which internally gives rise to a modern shape of violence, then modernity would 
at most merely provide the unique playing field in which the old game of terrorist vio-
lence is played out with new technological and ideational equipment. if there is an inner 
connection between modernity and terrorism, then modernity must generate both the 
playing field and the shape of the game itself.
We are unable to find resources to theorize such a link within the terrorism lit-
erature, even if theorists such as duyvesteyn, gueniffey, rapoport, and hoffman 
implicitly point us towards the need for such theorization. What we suggest is that 
we step behind the terrorism literature to a much earlier account of the relationship 
between modernity and terrorism: hegel’s account of the french revolution and the 
Terror. hegel’s work on the Terror has not, for the most part, directly informed the 
terrorism literature.
iii. hegel, hisTOry, and The OnTOlOgy Of MOderniTy
if we are to move from an instrumental or external understandings of the relationship 
between modernity and terrorism we must search for that inner dynamic which takes 
us from modernity to that violence we call terrorism. such a search requires, though, 
that we know what modernity is. here a turn to hegel’s political thought holds prom-
ise because he attempts to locate both what modernity is and connects this ontology 
of modernity to the Terror of the french revolution, such that the latter becomes, 
for him, the uniquely modern moment of violence. now, hegel’s grand theorizing has 
much fallen out of favour, replaced by more analytic concerns, and even his most in-
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fluential contemporary revivers, such as charles Taylor, have noted that hegel’s ‘on-
tology of geist is close to incredible’.20 yet, we can also grasp hegel’s social ontology 
simply as an attempt to locate the central organizing principle of a particular social 
world in a way that we have also seen in rapoport’s waves of terrorism. While the 
question of modernity’s relationship to terrorism does not require we accept or ex-
plore these larger claims about hegel’s ontology of Geist, we do need to begin with his 
account of the development of modernity in order to locate the principle he takes to 
be at work within it. 
in his most important political work, the Philosophy of  Right (published in 1821, and 
intended to accompany his lectures at the university of Berlin),21 hegel provides his 
reader with a broad and infamous periodization of world history as one that develops 
from the ethical inadequacies of the ‘Oriental realm’ through ‘greek’ and ‘roman’ 
worlds towards the completion of human freedom in the ‘germanic realm’.22 in doing 
so, hegel leaves us with the impression that modernity is exhausted by a particular 
set of familial, economic, and political institutions that would be broadly familiar to 
his lecture audience in the post-napoleonic West.23 hegel’s historical account, though, 
is undergirded not by a study of the procession and relation of empirical details con-
cerning institutions or attitudes, but by an account centred on principles of identity or 
self-conception. for hegel, only by grasping these principles of identity does one have 
a philosophically sound periodization. indeed, to fixate on the empirical details alone 
is to fixate on what is arbitrary. such details, as hegel says dismissively, ‘are questions 
of appearance, and consequently a matter for history’ and the historian; they are and 
not matters for ‘scientific cognition’ and the philosopher.24 These principles of identity, 
however, go beyond simply a matter of ideological world view or religious or cultural 
identity. They are objective structures of both individual identity and the institutional 
order because these principles are the internal source out of which the distinct empiri-
cal worlds of identity, culture, and institution are generated. so, for hegel, to grasp the 
principle of identity is to grasp the intrinsic connection between institution, meaning, 
action and epoch, for it is to grasp the principle of periodization itself. Those institu-
tions, meanings, and actions that do not fit the principle of the age are then to be seen 
as contingent: a matter of historical curiosity perhaps, but philosophically uninteresting. 
since our question is the relationship between this age of modernity and the act of ter-
rorism, hegel’s idea of principles of identity holds out the promise that we can inquire 
     20. charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society, cambridge, cambridge university Press, 1979, p. 69.
     21. hegel, Pr Preface, p. 9.
     22. hegel, Pr § 354. see also hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of  World History: Introduction: Reason in History, 
trans. h.B. nisbet, new york, cambridge university Press, 1984, pp. 196-209.
     23. indeed for this reason rudolf haym called hegel ‘the philosophical dictator of germany’ whose 
aim was to justify the political order ‘as it stood in Prussia in 1821’ (cited in Joachim ritter, Hegel and 
the French Revolution: Essays on the Philosophy of  Right, trans. richard dien Winfeld, cambridge, The MiT 
Press, 1984, pp. 35-36. for a good discussion, and rejection of hegel’s subservient relation to the Prussian 
state, especially as it pertains to the carlsbad decrees of september 20, 1819 see T. M. Knox, ‘hegel and 
Prussianism’ in Walter Kaufmann (ed.), Hegel’s Political Philosophy, new york, atherton Press, 1970, pp. 13-29.
     24. hegel, Pr § 258 remark [p. 276].
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into the relationship between modernity and terrorism in a fundamental rather than 
contingent (i.e., historical) way.
Within hegel’s most important political work, there are three principles of identity 
which structure human history. using his formidable terminology, they are: the substan-
tive, the subjective, and the ethical (Sittlich).25 although these labels are both opaque and 
abstract, their meanings can be translated into more familiar language. The substantive 
principle and the world it generates is one in which all identity is given—found before 
us—in the shape of fixed roles and obligations and traditions already, and unmodifi-
ably so, filled with content. hegel associates the substantive principle most strongly with 
the ancient ‘Oriental’ and ‘greek’ realms and their thorough-going dominance of the 
community.26 in contrast, the subjective principle and its world inverts the substantive 
principle, so that all the content of the world is now understood to be created by each 
individual, not imposed onto each. importantly, as we will see below, hegel links this 
principle to the french revolution and its Terror. finally, the principle of ethicality 
generates a world of institutions, meanings, and events that allows for the living unity 
or ‘interpenetration’27 of the previous principles of substance and subject, in what hegel 
calls ‘the infinitely subjective substantiality of ethical life’.28 This ‘ethical’ unity is possible, 
he suggests, only in the post-napoleonic world of the north european state: ‘for europe 
is the absolute end of history, just as asia is the beginning’.29 Only there does he see an 
empirical world in which the bearers of the two antecedent principles—particular in-
dividuality (subjectivity), and the state (substance)—find their proper relationship and 
fulfillment each inextricably through the other.
now we notice here, not a tension but a more complex mapping between the three-
fold principles of identity which allow a philosophic periodization and the periodiza-
tion that hegel provides in the Philosophy of  Right which moves from the Orient to the 
greeks and rome and ends with the germanic realm. The movement from the Orient 
to rome is for hegel a movement in which the principle of substantiality gives way, in 
discreet steps, to a world in which subjectivity becomes dominant within that substan-
tiality. The germanic realm encompasses all that comes after rome, and yet the ger-
manic realm is the realm of ethical modernity. We are left with the question: in what age 
does the principle of subjectivity reside? if subjectivity does not reside within moder-
nity and if the only great act of violence that hegel mentions, the Terror, is associated 
with subjectivity then hegel turns out to be a rather poor choice for understanding the 
relationship between modernity and terrorism. however, we ought not to give up on 
     25. These three principles are the articulations of three logical forms—universality, particularity, and 
singularity—which comprise the very structure of thought and the will (see hegel, Pr §§ 5-7, 24-27, 352-
354, and hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, with the Zusätze: Part I of  the Encyclopaedia of  Philosophical Sciences with 
the Zusätze, trans. T.f. geraets, W.a. suchting, h.s. harris, indianapolis, hackett Publishing company, 
1991, § 163.
     26. hegel, Pr § 355 remark.
     27. hegel, Pr § 261 remark [p. 284].
     28. hegel, Pr § 187 remark [p. 225].
     29. hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of  World History, p. 197.
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hegel too quickly, for he indicates that the germanic realm’s ethicality has two distinct 
shapes: one of ‘ethical barbarism and of crude arbitrariness’30 which he crucially asso-
ciates with the ‘inwardness of this principle’ of ethicality, i.e., with ‘subjectivity’;31 and, 
the other with ethicality absolved of barbarism because subjectivity comes to properly 
mediated and moderated by the substantiality of the state.32 although hegel speaks here 
of subjectivity as merely a modality of ethicality, and therefore as if ethicality were the 
only relevant principle for distinguishing the modern (germanic) world from the pre-
modern (Orient to rome), subjectivity is in fact both a logically and a politically distinct 
principle for hegel.33
so, hegel’s account of the singularity of modernity as an epoch, on one side, and 
the logical and political distinctness of the principles of subjectivity and substance on the 
other, are not in tension. instead, hegel points us to the way that modernity as an age is 
marked by two principles of identity. at its birth, modernity is animated by the principle 
of subjectivity and this establishment of ‘the right of subjective freedom […] is the pivotal 
and focal point in the difference between antiquity and the modern age’.34 at modernity’s 
end, when ‘actuality has gone through its formative process and attained its completed 
state’ and the ‘shape of [modern] life has grown old’,35 modernity is animated by the 
principle of ethicality: subjectivity interpenetrated with substantiality. so, modernity is 
one because the principle of ethicality underwrites that unity, yet it has two philosophi-
cally distinct moments depending on whether one focuses on its birth or its completion. 
in modernity’s old age, for hegel, the principle of subjectivity will give to the ethical state 
its enormous strength and depth because it allows the principle of subjectivity to attain 
fulfillment in the self-sufficient extreme of personal particularity, while at the same time 
bringing it back to substantial unity’.36 But, at modernity’s birth this same principle necessarily 
produces ‘the most terrible and drastic event’,37 ‘the fanaticism of destruction, demolish-
ing the whole existing order, eliminating all individuals regarded as suspect by a given 
order, and annihilating any organization which attempts to arise anew’.38 so, to grasp 
the inner connection between modernity and terrorism, in a way that existing approach-
es do not, we now need to explore with hegel this uniquely modern principle of identity.
     30. hegel, Pr § 359.
     31. hegel, Pr § 359.
     32. hegel, Pr § 360.
     33. see hegel, Pr §§ 25, 33, and Part ii Morality; and hegel, Phg ‘absolute freedom and Terror’, ¶¶ 582-
595. for a discussion of the relationship between the terms ‘ethical’ and ‘morality’ and in the Philosophy of  
Right and Phenomenology see Will dudley, ‘ethical life, Morality and the role of spirit’ in dean Moyar and 
Michael Quante (eds.), Hegel’s Phenomenology of spirt: A Critical Guide, new york, cambridge university 
Press, 2008.
     34. hegel, Pr § 124 remark. We must say ‘establishment’, not simply ‘awareness’ of subjectivity because, 
e.g., hegel notes that in part Plato’s genius consisted in his being ‘aware that the ethics of his time were being 
penetrated by a deeper principle’ (hegel, Pr Preface pp. 20-21; see also §§ 46 remark, 185 remark [pp. 
222-223] and addition, 206 remark [p. 238], and 262 remark and addition).
     35. hegel, Pr Preface, p. 23.
     36. hegel, Pr § 260.
     37. hegel, Pr § 258 remark [p. 277].
     38. hegel, Pr § 5 remark [p. 38].
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iV. The sOcial lOgic Of MOderniTy aT iTs BirTh
for hegel, the political playing out of the logic of subjectivity occurs in the french rev-
olution, and so we need to turn to his account of that event in his Phenomenology of  Mind. 
as we will see, there are three uniquely modern demands which subjectivity makes. 
They concern: (sec. a) the sources of political and cultural meaning; (sec. B) the neces-
sity of membership in a community; and, (sec. c) the possibilities of the community’s 
speaking on behalf of its members. as we will see in Part V, these three demands consti-
tute the inner dynamic of modernity itself towards violence and not merely pre-conditions 
for violence.
A. The Individual Will as the Absolute Source of  Meaning
To be certain that one’s world view is correct and ought to be respected by others is not 
a unique feature of modernity’s principle of subjectivity. however, pre-modern claims to 
individual certainty are grounded in a different principle: they are undergirded by sub-
stantive claims of externally given authority—one here needs only to think of socrates 
and his daimonion, roman formal reliance on auguries, and the abrahamic religions’ 
use of revelation as its moment of grounding authority. for hegel, the emergence of 
modernity’s founding principle radically transforms the source of our certainty from a 
pre-modern externality to a new, modern internality. rather than the external world 
transported inwards (e.g., through spiritual messengers, animal innards, divine revela-
tion or more prosaically, an attitude of piety and obedience to the community’s laws 
and traditions), the subject—the one who experiences this certainty—is now taken to 
be the source of all meaning. Modernity’s birth is simultaneously the birth of a new ‘self-
consciousness’, one that ‘grasps the fact that its certainty of itself is the essence of all spiri-
tual “masses”, or spheres, of the real as well as the supersensible world, or conversely, 
that essence and actuality are consciousness’s knowledge of itself  ’.39 With this new mode 
of self-consciousness, the pre-modern possibilities and relations of identity are inverted: 
the multiplex differentiations of existing social, cultural, political, and religious life all 
can no longer be understood to have their own validity, their own obligations, and re-
spect that is owed to them by their very givenness. They can no longer serve as a source 
for self-consciousness’ content. in hegel’s language, ‘the complexities of existence’ in 
which the first modern self-consciousness finds itself ‘immersed’ at its birth—i.e., the 
premodern into which the modern consciousness is born—are now obstacles to mean-
ing, rather than its source.40
in this way, hegel asks us to look at this first modern self-consciousness and its 
system of meaning, not in terms of some its concrete content (e.g., the particular ideo-
logical content of anarchism, nationalism, communism, or religious fundamentalism 
which rapoport identifies) but as a relation to concrete content. This uniquely modern 
relation is that all pre-existing concrete content whatsoever is rejected because its source 
     39. hegel, Phg ¶ 584.
     40. hegel, Phg ¶ 594 [p. 362].
gaVin caMerOn and JOshua d. gOldsTein 71
is other than the individual will. Therefore, unlike the pre-modern sources of meaning, 
first modernity’s are absolute and singular. absolute, because the ‘complexities of exis-
tence’ have lost their validity and no given content can constitute a meaningful chal-
lenge to the will. singular, because in ‘the view, especially prevalent since rousseau’, 
meaning has but a single source: ‘the particular individual, […] [i.e.,] the will of the single 
person in his distinctive arbitrariness’.41 
at this point, hegel’s foundation for modernity and modern terrorism can seem 
but a variant of the idea of rejectionist violence: violence emerges out of the dismissal 
of externally-validated orders or structures. despite this conformity, there is something 
more radical going on in hegel’s account. for hegel’s identification of the modern self-
consciousness is one that does not depend upon or require any particular content. in this 
way, modernity’s animating principle is prior to ideological content and is indeed the pre-
condition for the development of any truly modern ideologies by establishing the modern 
relation of individuals to the world. nonetheless, the radicality of hegel’s rejectionist ac-
count does not take it beyond the core features that hoffman, and many others, see as 
constitutive of terrorism as a phenomenon (whether modern or not): first, violence is 
‘organized, deliberate and systematic’ rather than random or indiscriminate; second, it 
reflects a drive to create a ‘new and better society’ to replace a corrupt or unfair politi-
cal system.42 so, to understand modern terrorism, we do not need to look for ideological 
content that forms a ‘blue print’ of a new world, but we do need to see how this uniquely 
modern self-consciously nonetheless produces relational criteria for a new world, one that 
no world can ever actualize—as we will see. The first such criterion is membership in 
a community.
B. Membership in the Community as the Absolute Duty
if modernity’s birth places ‘the will of the single person in his distinctive arbitrariness’ 
as the ‘substantial and primary factor’43 we might think that hegel would see modernity 
as demanding a radical pluralism or relativity of meaning, e.g., as present in Thomas 
hobbes’ political philosophy in the late seventeenth century, who argues that there is 
no ‘finis ultimus, (ultimate aim,) nor summum bonum, (greatest good,) as is spoken of in the 
books of the old moral philosophers’ to rule and measure objectively individual claims 
about the good.44 now, terrorism as a project requires a motivation that is political and 
therefore that is bound up with shared and not radically idiosyncratic understandings of 
the world. in other words, terrorism as a project requires ideas that exist in such a way 
that one can act on their behalf. hoffman and others have observed that ‘the terrorist is fun-
damentally an altruist: he believes that he is serving a ‘good’ cause designed to achieve 
a greater good for a wider constituency—whether real or imagined—that the terrorist 
     41. hegel, Pr § 29 remark.
     42. hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 4.
     43. hegel, Pr § 29 remark.
     44. Thomas hobbes, The Leviathan, new york, Oxford university Press, 1998 [1651], Bk. i, ch. 11 [1], p. 65.
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and his organization purport to represent’.45 since terrorism qua terrorism is not, literally, 
madness, terrorism qua terrorism requires membership in a community. if the founding 
principle of modernity does not contain an internal dynamic to community then terror-
ism either cannot be uniquely modern or, if uniquely modern, it cannot be terrorism.
for hegel, rousseau’s political writings anticipate the shape of the first modern 
community by articulating the new shape of membership that modernity’s birth de-
mands: membership must not be understood as membership in a particular, historically 
bound, and therefore finite, community but as membership in a universal or infinite 
community created and sustained only by the active participation of each individual 
subjectivity. rousseau called this membership and its attendant community the ‘general 
will’ (volonté général). Within it, hegel sees radically creative possibilities, for unlike pre-
modern communities, this general will, this first modern conception of the community 
is ‘not the empty thought of will which consists in silent assent, or assent by a representa-
tive, but a real general will, the will of all individuals as such’.46 Only in this active self-cre-
ation can membership not be something externally conferred by birth (e.g., the greeks) 
or a juridical act (e.g., romans) or through voluntary assent for pragmatic reasons (e.g., 
British seventeenth century social contract theorists, hobbes and locke), but internally 
produced. Membership here dictates the possibilities of the community’s content, for if 
it emerges out of all individuals, then that content can only be ‘the common element arising 
out of […] [each] individual will as a conscious will ’.47 in other words, the community can 
not consist in what is empirically shared or common to individuals but only what is ‘com-
monly’ willed by all individuals. for this reason, hegel speaks of the birth of the modern 
self-consciousness as the seeming destruction or loss of the community as ‘each individ-
ual consciousness raises itself out of its [previously] allotted sphere, [so that it] no longer 
finds its essence and its work in this particular sphere, but [instead] grasps itself as the 
concept [Begriff] of the will, [and] grasps all spheres as the essence of this will’.48 What is 
lost, though, is not the idea of membership in community as critical to identity but the 
idea that identity and membership is defined by given content (e.g., class, religion, eth-
nicity, geography, birth, etc.), rather than an act of the will.
so, at this moment at the birth of modernity, we have the critical reconfiguration of 
the relationship between the absolute source of meaning (the individual will) and the re-
     45. hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 37.
     46. hegel, Phg ¶ 584; see also hegel, Pr § 258 remark [p. 277] and Jean-Jacques rousseau, The Social 
Contract in The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings, trans. Victor gourevitch (ed.), new york, 
cambridge university Press, 2003 [1762], Bk. ii, ch.1, p. 368.
     47. hegel, Pr § 258 remark [p. 277].
     48. hegel, Phg ¶ 585 (translation modified, here and elsewhere, so that Begriff reads ‘concept’ instead of 
‘notion’). compare this modern setting-aside of the given world with Joseph de Maistre, the preeminent 
philosopher of the counter-revolution, who comments ‘every man has certain duties to fulfil, and the extent 
of his duties is relative to his civil position and the extent of his means. The same action on the part of two 
given men may be very far from being equally criminal. in the same way, an action that is only an error 
or a bit of madness on the part of an obscure man suddenly raised to unlimited power would be a crime if 
committed by a bishop, duke, or peer’ (Joseph de Maistre, Considerations on France, trans. richard a. lebrun 
(ed.), new york, cambridge university Press, 2006 [1797], ch. 2, pp. 10-11).
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quirement of membership in the community. if there is nothing valid outside of my will, 
then the process of willing together the formation of the community (participating in 
the general will) is the only process by which i, as an individual, can determine whether 
what i will has emerged from the now-invalid complexities of external existence or has 
emerged from my subjectivity alone. for subjectivity is that pure universality ‘in which 
every limitation, every content, whether present immediately through nature, through 
needs, desires, and drives, or given and determined in some other way, is dissolved’.49 
in this way, the modern principle of subjectivity cannot exist without membership, and 
the shape of this membership cannot be any other than membership in the universal 
community. notice here how this ontologically modern idea of membership radicalizes 
the relationship between individual and identity. The individual does not represent some 
good (e.g., as hoffman characterizes it) as if the good were external and independent 
of individuals. The good is only present, now, as the will of each, and only exists as that 
willing-together, as the general will. as we will see below, this unity of good and the will 
has profound implications for the shape of the community and for fashioning moder-
nity’s inner dynamic towards the ‘fanaticism of destruction’.
C. The Community as the Absolute Truth of  the Individual Will
Modernity lives not only as a principle but as a world or, more prosaically, a commu-
nity. unlike approaches that look to the distinctive shape of the modern community in 
unique forms of communication or transportatio n technology, particular ideological 
goals, tactical intentions, or some particular religious world view hegel’s account of sub-
jectivity as the principle of first modernity suggests they are not able to grasp what is de-
finitively unique about modernity itself because they look for a unique content to moder-
nity, whereas modernity’s uniquely animating principle can produce only a world that 
‘no longer has any content, possession, existence, or outer extension, but is merely this 
knowledge of itself as an absolutely pure and free individual self ’.50 since the principle 
at modernity’s birth only can give rise to a new relation to content, one in which there 
are no valid ‘complexities of existence’, hegel’s account draws our attention to the way 
in which modernity’s absolute demands of meaning and membership construct a new 
kind of community through a new consciousness of the proper relationship between the 
individual and the community.
This new, uniquely modern relationship promises that the ‘earthly’ world of every-
day practical action will become the ‘heavenly’ world animated by what is now taken to 
be the only true foundational principle, the individual will. in the french revolution, 
hegel sees this promise play itself out in a community which attempts to live such that 
‘[t]he two worlds are reconciled and heaven is transplanted to the earth below’.51 The 
‘heaven’, though, consists in no substantial blueprint, no positive image of the content of 
the new world, but is the principle that the world, i.e., the community, is to be animated 
     49. hegel, Pr § 5, remark and addition.
     50. hegel, Phg ¶ 590.
     51. hegel, Phg ¶ 581 [p. 355].
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only by the individual will. so animated, the community can then liberate the individ-
ual from the merely given content, the ‘complexities of existence’ of the old world. in 
this way, the first modern community can speak and act for the individual, not because 
the community represents the individual or the individual is organically included within 
the community, but because the community’s will is the true will of the individual. its 
rules and measures are the individual’s own rules and measures. for hegel, rousseau 
infamously captures the logic of this new purely modern community in the demands 
it can authentically make on behalf of the individual him- or herself when he writes in 
the Social Contract that ‘whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to 
do so by the entire body: which means nothing other than that he shall be forced to be 
free’52—i.e., forced to be what he or she most authentically is.
although, the modern community begins with the individual will as its singular 
foundation, once the community becomes the truth of the individual’s will, then the in-
dividual has lost all valid claim that she or he can make against the community. indeed, 
now any difference between the community and the individual cannot be understood as 
the difference between two different but valid (even if hierarchically arranged) duties or 
principles or interests, but as ‘only the semblance of an antithesis [Gegensatzes]’.53 as isaiah 
Berlin has noted, a profound difference exists between a claim by the community that its 
deliberations are just or insightful or authoritative and a claim that its deliberations are 
the truth of one’s own thoughts and insights, regardless of what one thinks and sees.54 The 
former claim is found in pre-modernity, the latter is uniquely modern. so, although be-
ginning foundationally with the individual will, modernity’s birth nonetheless requires 
an absolute community. ‘absolute’, because there are no sources of meaning or author-
ity other than the individual will whose truth is only spoken through the community.
rousseau, Tocqueville, and Berlin see a danger associated with this modern, abso-
lute community. however, each locates this danger as something external to the struc-
ture or nature of the modern community itself. for rousseau, the community of the 
general will is the solution to the possibility of ‘the most enormous abuses’55 caused by 
traditional (i.e., pre-modern) rulers and modes of authority—the problem of tyranny 
that the literature on terrorism notes emerges as a trope—because modernity’s new 
relation of community to individual ought to make it ‘impossible for the [social] body 
ever to want to harm all of its members, and […] it cannot harm any one of them in 
particular’.56 Tocqueville and Berlin each take this idea of an external threat and locate 
it explicitly in some pre-existing disposition for which the idea of a universal community 
as the ‘finis ultimus’ or ‘summum bonum’ furnishes new justifications. as Tocqueville 
suggests ‘[u]ntil our day it had been thought that tyranny was odious in all its forms. 
now it has been discovered that there are legitimate tyrannies and sacred injustices, 
     52. rousseau, Social Contract Bk. i, ch. 7 [8], p. 364.
     53. hegel, Phg ¶ 586.
     54. isaiah Berlin ‘Two concepts of liberty’ in Liberty, henry hardy (ed.), new york, Oxford university 
Press, 2005, pp. 179-180.
     55. rousseau, Social Contract, Bk. i, ch. 7 [8].
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provided that they are exercised in the name of the people’.57 Berlin elaborates this jus-
tification writing in the voice of such a tyrant:
i may conceive myself as an inspired artist, who moulds men into patterns in 
the light of his unique vision, as painters combine colours or composers sounds; 
humanity is the raw material upon which i impose my creative will; even though 
men suffer and die in the process, they are lifted by it to a height to which they 
could never have risen without my coercive—but creative—violation of their lives. 
This is the argument used by every dictator, inquisitor and bully who seeks some 
moral, or even aesthetic, justification for his conduct.58
yet, in a way that rousseau, Tocqueville, and Berlin—and the terrorism literature which 
emphasizes that modernity provides conditions (material, technological, ideational) for 
terrorism to use—do not, hegel grasps that there is an immanent and not instrumental 
dynamic from the logic of this community to a ‘fanaticism of destruction’ and ‘the most 
terrible and drastic event’.59 so ivianski, e.g., is correct that this modern revolution and 
its forging of a new community and person will allow actions to be taken ‘in the name 
of nations, without consulting them and claiming their gratitude while trampling them 
underfoot’,60 but we need to grasp why it is modernity itself which produces this result.
V. MOderniTy’s ‘fanaTicisM Of desTrucTiOn’: Three shaPes Of 
ViOlence
for hegel, the violence of the Terror is one with the violence of the revolution—not 
because violence in both phases of the revolution is instrumentalized, but because vio-
lence for both is the immanent consequence of the first modern matrix of meaning (the 
individual will), membership (as an absolute duty), and community (as the only valid 
voice of the individual) established by the principle of subjectivity. When set in motion 
as a force in the world, this matrix itself gives birth to: (sec. a) a ‘heavenly’ violence con-
sisting in a reconceptualization and destruction of existing meaning; (sec. B) an ‘earthly’ 
violence that is directed against individual and collective deviation from the commu-
nity; and, (sec. c) the necessary equation of the use of violence with death as spectacle. 
so, to understand how the logic of modern self-consciousness gives rise to violence thus 
provides an account of the logic and shape of an ontologically modern terrorism.
A. Heavenly Violence: The Destruction of  Meaning
hegel’s account of the violence of the french revolution and the Terror can have the 
appearance, as philosophy often does, of merely dressing up a commonplace in impen-
     57. cited in Zeev ivianski, ‘The Terrorist revolution: roots of Modern Terrorism’ in david rapoport 
(ed.), Inside Terrorist Organizations, london, frank cass, 1988, p. 129.
     58. Berlin ‘Two concepts of liberty’, p. 197.
     59. hegel, Pr§§ 5 remark [p. 38], 258 remark [p. 277].
     60. alexis de Tocqueville, quoted in ivianski, ‘The Terrorist revolution: roots of Modern Terrorism’, 
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etrable language. The commonplace in his account of violence seems to be of two sorts. 
first, that violence is merely a pragmatic response to resistance that accompanies the 
process by which ‘each individual consciousness raises itself out of its [previously] allot-
ted sphere’.61 second, an idea at least as old as Plato and aristotle,62 that violence is a 
response to conflicts between world views. if either of these commonplaces validly ap-
plied to hegel’s analysis, he could make no contribution to answering the relationship 
between modernity and terrorism. We will deal with the first commonplace in sec. B 
below. let us turn to the second commonplace here.
ideological conflict by itself is merely contingent conflict for the simple reason that 
it requires something outside of itself as the instigating factor. in an obscure sentence, 
hegel provides a radically different account of the conflict between the new world view 
of modernity and that of the ancien régime. using the word ‘concept’ (Begriff) as a term-
of-art to capture a foundational world view animated and made logically coherent by 
a particular principle, hegel writes: ‘What made the concept [of the ancien régime] into 
an existent object was its diremption into separate subsistent spheres, but when the object 
[i.e., the ‘real’ world of objective existence] becomes a concept as the will [as it does in 
modernity’s first moment], there is no longer anything in it [the objective world] with a 
continuing existence; negativity has permeated all its moments’.63 here, hegel side-steps 
completely an account of the particular ways that modernity’s world view might conflict 
with the ancien régime with regard to political authority, religion, equality, or some such. 
instead he notes only that there is nothing in the ancien régime that has continued meaning 
and therefore which affirms anything valid. With modernity’s birth all that had positive 
content is now permeated instead with ‘negativity’—it becomes worthless, of no mean-
ing. The conflict is not between ideational realms and their attendant, concrete social 
worlds (or plans for a social world), but between an ideational realm that claims to be 
the truth of the world as a universal community which is opposed to all content—all ‘com-
plexities of existence’—whatsoever.
We have here, and for the first time, something other than a conflict between two 
ideological blueprints. for in the latter, the conflict exists where one contentful vision of 
the world comes into conflict with another contentful vision. here, though, the conflict 
is between the purity of the will and any content at all. so, our great mistake is to under-
stand the unique shape of modernity’s own violence as a response to this or that feature 
of the ancien régime. indeed, we can say that the ancien régime itself, with its particular fea-
tures of social, political, cultural, and economic organization, is not the specific object 
of attack. rather, it is the very existence of any concrete world which claims validity that 
is the object of attack—and this world happens to be in the shape of the ancien régime.
in this way, the first moment of truly modern violence, hegel shows us, is not the 
moment of physical violence, but the ideational (not ideological) destruction of the va-
     61. hegel, Phg ¶ 585.
     62. Plato, Euthyphro 7d, and aristotle, The Politics Bk. 5, both speaking of conflicts over conceptions of 
justice.
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lidity of any existent world. What is destroyed is not just the old world of meaning but 
the very possibility of transferring any meaning (e.g., what is true, just, or good) to new 
world. for, once the source of meaning is shifted to the immaterial principle of the will 
and the universal community, i.e., to a ‘heaven’ which consists not just in the forsaking 
of these complexities of existence, but all complexities of existence (present or imagined), 
then no particularity (be it given institution, obligation, duty, role, identity, material 
condition and so on) is left in the world that could act as a limit to action. no moment 
of the empirical world can conceptually avoid being ‘permeated with negativity’. To be 
something concrete and something other than the will of the community is to be mean-
ingless and affirmative of nothing. 
While the terrorism literature identifies numerous causative factors for terrorism, a 
common heuristic element is the role of ideology. as we have seen, such ideational con-
siderations represent a convenient means of distinguishing between types of terrorism, 
but remain insufficient to account for what is uniquely modern in that violence. in this 
regard, we argue that hegel’s account does not require the displacement of those ac-
counts which focus on conflicts over the nature of the relevant ‘complexities of existence’ 
for three reasons. first, hegel provides a way, now, to evaluate ideologies and therefore 
ideological conflict to see if they are ontologically rather than just temporally modern—i.e., 
whether the ideologies are animated by the world view of the principle that gives birth 
to modernity: subjectivity. Therefore, ideology and modernity as sources of terrorism 
are not competing explanations. second, in relation to this first point, some terroristic 
instances of violence may, indeed, simply be ideological in that they are animated by a 
particular ‘blue print’ of how the world should be specifically organized, attentive to the 
complexities of existence and, therefore, not ontologically modern. Third, even where 
the terroristic violence is ontologically modern, the specific way in which the principle 
of modernity is lived may nonetheless take on or borrow from existing ideologies. But, 
in doing so, the ideology merely imparts a specific character—albeit, outward and ines-
sential—to the act, just as a disease can impart certain characteristics to an organism, 
without being the nature of the organism itself.
now, let us turn to an examination of what the total forsaking of the complexities of 
existence means for the perpetration of violence.
B. Earthly Violence: The Destruction of  Things
if we understand ‘heavenly’ violence to be merely a condition of possibility for physi-
cal or ‘earthly’ violence then we grasp modernity not as something with an internal dy-
namic to violence, but as merely the kindling onto which some external spark (existing 
where?) comes to be thrown. if this gap between ‘heavenly’ and ‘earthly’ violence could 
not be filled by the inner dynamic of modernity at its birth, then hegel’s understanding 
of the relationship between the demands of a world view and physical violence would be 
no different than Karl Marx’s who notes that the proletariat’s ‘contest with the bourgeoi-
sie’ is necessitated by class identity, but the transformation of the conflict into a violent 
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revolution that ‘sweeps away by force the old conditions of production’ is merely ‘com-
pelled, by the force of  the circumstances’.64 Violence and revolution, for Marx, are not the true 
work of communism because they are not intrinsically bound to its world view—even if 
the practical situation may make violence unavoidable. 
similarly, one could think of Machiavelli’s advice to the Prince to be attentive to 
the ways that violence or ‘cruelties [can be] badly used or well used’. cruelties well 
used are those bound by the pragmatic ‘necessity to secure oneself, and are then not 
persisted in but are turned to as much utility for the subjects as one can’ whereas ‘[t]
hose cruelties are badly used which, though few in the beginning, rather grow with 
time than are eliminated’.65 The Prince only goes wrong, for Machiavelli, when he takes 
his guide not from the what hegel will call the ‘complexities of existence’ (in Princes’ 
case, the objective interests of his state as well as other relevant social classes) but from 
what Machiavelli calls the ‘imagined republics’ which ‘have never been seen or known 
to exist in truth’.66 Within terrorists’ own accounts of their actions, this idea of action 
compelled by force of circumstance appears as the common theme ‘we had no choice’—
e.g., Menachem Begin writing on his involvement with the irgun, ‘What use was there 
in writing memoranda? What value in speeches? […] no, there was no other way. if we 
did not fight, we should be destroyed. To fight was the only way to salvation’.67
so, for both Machiavelli and Marx, as well as the terrorism literature, earthly vio-
lence can be limited by the appropriate apprehension of facts in the world and by the 
objective determinations of actual interests. unlike their pragmatic—and therefore con-
tingent—exercise of earthly violence, hegel’s account of the logic of modernity’s found-
ing points us towards an immanent dynamic between heavenly and earthly violence, 
for he claims that modernity’s first founding necessarily produces the ‘destruction of the 
actual organization of the world’.68 indeed, hegel’s claim is even stronger than merely 
the existence of this immanent dynamic from heavenly to earthly violence: it is that the 
process of physically dissolving the externally valid world is the only possible work that mo-
dernity’s first world view can accomplish. The permeation of negativity (i.e., that what 
has concrete content is meaningless) throughout all the moments of ancien régime extends 
to the permeation of negativity throughout all the work of the revolution, even the 
     64. Karl Marx and friedrich engels, The Communist Manifesto, new york, Oxford university Press, 1998, 
p.26; emphasis added.
     65. niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. leo Paul s. de alvarez, long grove, Waveland Press, 1989 
[1513], ch. Viii, pp. 37-38.
     66. Machiavelli, The Prince, ch. XV, p. 61.
     67. Menachem Begin, The Revolt: Story of  the Irgun, new york, henry schuman, 1951, p. 46. similarly, 
Bassam abu-sharif, a leading member of the PflP from its foundation, wrote about his response in the 
aftermath of the six day War in 1967: ‘There was no going back. My own fight began here, now. i would 
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country, or die for it. i could not lead a normal life...could i just walk away from these people around me 
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Brown & company, 1995, p. 50).
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‘positive’ work of building a new society. in this way gueniffey is correct when he sug-
gests that ‘[Terror] had become an integral component of the revolution, inseparable 
from it, because only terror could ultimately bring about a republic of citizens […]. if 
the republic of free citizens was not yet possible, it was because men, warped by their 
history, remained evil; through Terror, the revolution—history as yet unwritten and 
brand new—would make a new kind of man’.69
hegel’s analysis of the french revolution reveals that the movement from heavenly 
(ideational) to earthly (physical) destruction takes two forms within modernity’s found-
ing. The first form consists in the total destruction of the old social world, not because 
it possesses this or that substantive quality or because of any objective resistance it pres-
ents—as hegel says, the matrix of modernity ascends ‘without any power being able to 
resist it’70—but because that world, in whatever shape it takes, has come to be through a 
process other than the individual will whose universal truth is spoken for it by the com-
munity. We normally associate this first form of violence with revolution and the extir-
pation of the old social order, even one so thorough that ‘the being of faith’ disappears 
into ‘the exhalation of a stale gas, of vacuous Être suprême’.71
The second form of violence is easy to overlook because it initially appears as a posi-
tive development: the construction of universal projects in which the old ‘complexities 
of existence’ are replaced not with new complexities but attempts to bring the ‘general 
will’—the universal community—into earthly existence. To do so requires that the com-
munity not be animated by this or that aim, its product not be this or that law, its activity 
not a project for this or that group. rather, community’s purpose now must be ‘the gen-
eral purpose, its language universal law, its work the universal work’.72 in hegel’s account 
of late or ethical modernity this universalism of purpose, law, and deed is a positive de-
velopment because it then regulates and holds a new set of ‘complexities of existence’ 
universally available for the state’s citizens to participate in. however at modernity’s 
founding, where subjectivity alone is the organizing principle, this very universalism is 
ironically a continuation of that first shape of earthly violence which had abolished the 
old, particularist social order. for in heralding a new world this universal language, 
codes of laws, and work for the general welfare serves as a continuation of earthly vio-
lence by preventing the emergence of definite rules, concrete practices, and specific laws. 
established instead is only the contentlessness and therefore infinitely pliant thought of 
law (as for example, natural law),73 the thought of justice (as for example the ever chang-
     69. gueniffey, La politique de la Terreur, cited in chaliand and Blin, The History of  Terrorism, p. 102. 
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     72. hegel, Phg ¶ 585.
     73. for dan edelstein, natural law played a crucial, but instrumental, role in the Terror by furnishing 
for use ‘a legal category, the hostis humani generis [enemy of all humanity] which thus provided a legal 
justification for the exterminating zeal of the Jacobin Terrorists’ (dan edelstein, ‘Hostis Humani Generis: 
cOsMOs and hisTOry80
ing court procedures), or the thought of well-being (e.g., the ‘declaration of the rights of 
Man and of the citizen’ of 1789).
The result of both shapes of earthly violence (the extirpation of the old order and 
the prevention of a new one under the guise of establishing universal laws, works, and 
purposes) is that, in hegel’s words, the logic of modernity’s founding can ‘let[] nothing 
break loose to become a free object standing over against it’.74 as such, a social world ani-
mated by the principle of subjectivity
cannot achieve anything positive, either universal works of language or of reality, 
either of laws and general institutions of conscious freedom, or of deeds and works 
of freedom that wills them. [for] [t]he work which conscious freedom might 
accomplish would consist in that freedom, qua universal substance, making itself 
into an object and into an enduring being.75
Because the principle at modernity’s birth cannot allow anything to objectively endure, 
the birth of modernity is simultaneously the birth of a dynamic to earthly violence that 
is, in principle, without limit. no objective condition is a boundary; no action—insofar 
as it authentically emerges from the matrix of modernity—is instrumental and therefore 
is subject neither to pragmatic calculation nor restriction. 
now, this idea that terrorism, and modern terrorism in particular, is character-
ized by a dynamic to violence that is, at least, not fully explicable as an instrumental 
calculation is also present within the terrorism literature. for example, we see chali-
and and Blin suggest that the violence within the french revolution can be seen as 
an example of total terror, something that far exceeds any conceivable instrumental 
purpose.76 We see hannah arendt, provides a non-instrumental dynamic in the idea 
of a ‘law of movement’ whose engine is some collective identity and whose objects 
are indeterminate:
Terror is the realization of the law of movement; its chief aim is to make it possible 
for the force of nature or of history to race freely through mankind, unhindered by 
any spontaneous human action […]. it is this movement which singles out the foes 
of mankind against whom terror is let loose, and no free action of either opposition 
or sympathy can be permitted to interfere with the elimination of the ‘objective 
enemy’ of history or nature, of the class or the race.77
similarly, rapoport identifies modernity’s waves of terrorism as ‘driven by a common 
predominant energy that shapes the participating groups’ characteristics and mutual 
relationships’78 rather than by objective and definite goals. 
devils, natural right, Terror, and the french revolution,’ Telos: A Quarterly Journal of  Critical Thought vol. 
141, 2007, pp. 57-81, p. 80).
     74. hegel, Phg ¶ 588.
     75. hegel, Phg ¶ 588.
     76. gérard chaliand and arnaud Blin, ‘The invention of Modern Terror’ in chaliand and Blin, The 
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     77. arendt, The Origins of  Totalitarianism, pp. 464-65.
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These three approaches to locate the move to violence outside of prudential 
calculation and in the nature of identity itself reflect hegelian insights into the nature of 
truly modern violence. however, these insights stop at the first form of earthly violence: 
it is the mere otherness of the existing world or group or individuals who are singled 
out, that they differ from the community who speaks on behalf of the true or primary 
identity (e.g., ‘history or nature’, ‘class or the race’ for arendt, the various ideologies of 
modernity for rapoport) that seemingly provokes the violence. in this use of ‘otherness’, 
though there remains the idea that there is some objective quality which picks out 
the enemy and, therefore, conversely some feature of the objects that could limit the 
violence, mark out its scope, divide the guilty from the innocent. in this way, these 
approaches within, or which inform, the terrorism literature fail to appreciate or see the 
full logic of violence contained in purely modern identity: that there is a second form 
of violence which consists not in the destruction of the old world, but in the conceptual 
impossibility of substantively creating a new world (as opposed to the emptiness of talk 
and declarations), of letting anything or anyone stand as meaningfully independent of the 
community. The primary concern is not what it objectively is, but did it come from the 
will of the universal community?
This failure to appreciate this second and preventative form of earthly violence, or 
the logic of identity that animates it, leads to a failure to be able to explain the necessity 
of the movement from the identification of the other or enemy or guilty as worthless to 
the requirement of their death, and death as spectacle.
C. From Violence to the Total and Spectacular Work of  Death
robespierre justified the use of terror and its place within the revolution in two key 
speeches delivered on december 25, 1793 and february 5, 1794. in the first, he differen-
tiated between constitutional government and revolutionary government. The former 
sought the preservation of the republic; the latter, the foundation of the republic, a goal 
that necessitated defending the republic against its enemies. robespierre argued that: ‘To 
good citizens the revolutionary government owes the nation’s every safeguard; to enemies 
of the people it owes only death’. in the later speech, he outlines the ‘Principles of Political 
Morality which should guide the national convention in the internal administration of 
the republic’, stating that ‘in revolution [the principle of popular government] is simulta-
neously virtue and terror: virtue, without which terror is fatal, and terror, without which 
virtue is powerless’.79 in doing so he implies that there is some way to distinguish between 
‘good citizens’ and ‘enemies of the people’—i.e., as if the criteria distinguishing guilt and 
innocence were objectively available and that, therefore, violence could avoid being ‘cru-
elty badly used’ in Machiavelli’s words. hegel’s account of the necessary failure to sustain 
this distinction between innocent and guilty is crucial for explaining the systemic and in-
ternal dynamic from violence directed at particular and limited objects (e.g., the ancien 
régime) to unlimited and total violence such as characterized the Terror.
     79. carter, ‘The french revolution’, pp. 139-140.
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at its birth, violence is modernity’s immanent fulfillment: its certainty of being the 
truth of the world can occur only through a universal community whose very logic, we 
have shown, requires the conceptual (heavenly) and the twin physical (earthly) dissolu-
tion of the validity of the complexities of existence. yet, why does this internal dynamic 
towards violence require death? if the external world is removed of meaning, if the old 
world is powerless as hegel suggests, then why is death the immanent fulfillment of mo-
dernity’s founding for hegel? This question, which is as crucial for the study of geno-
cide80 as it is for terrorism, can be answered by examining hegel’s account of the trans-
formation of the revolution into the Terror. in that account we can reconstruct why 
the promise of respect and recognition for subjectivity present in modernity’s drive for 
‘universal freedom’ becomes ‘merely the fury of destruction’.81
at first, we might take hegel’s argument to be that the failure to build a new world, 
to establish new ‘complexities of existence’, produces ‘the fury of destruction’ simply as 
some pragmatic diversion or instrumental response temporarily needed to overcome 
objective obstacles to the revolution. indeed, this pragmatic use of violence is what 
the revolutionary government itself hoped with saint-Just, for example, arguing that 
‘terror was but a temporary substitute for the institutions which could ensure the sur-
vival of a republic properly constituted’.82 Once the republic had been established and 
safeguarded, terror would have met its purpose and could be replaced. This hope is, for 
hegel, betrayed not by a man (robespierre), but by the very logic of modernity at its 
birth which animates the revolution itself both in its destruction of the ancien régime and 
the revolution itself. Why so?
for the first modern community, to exercise its certainty of itself, it must replace 
the old particularist, differentiated world with a new one that instantiates its respect for 
the will as the source of all meaning by establishing the duty of universal membership 
in a universal community. here, the modern community experiences a necessary con-
tradiction between how the new world is understood to be (the will alone is the truth 
of the world) and the new world’s ability to live that understanding. To live is to act in 
the world, to decide and to do—and only individuals (i.e., subjects) can decide and do; 
structure is not agency. Thus, ‘[b]efore the universal can perform a deed it must concen-
trate itself into the One of individuality and put at the head an individual self-conscious-
ness; for the universal will is only an actual will in a self, which is a One’.83 yet, the truth 
of the individual remains the universal community. so, in the very moment of decision 
the individual act ceases to be a moment of the universal will of the community and be-
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comes the product of that one or few who decided. in the tragic—and fatal—irony of 
modernity’s birth, the very attempt by individuals to make the universal will live only 
serves to divide those very individuals from the community.
in the context of the french revolution hegel captures this paradox by speaking 
in terms of the problem of government and faction. On the one hand, for the modern 
community to live, government must be established; ‘[o]n the other hand, it [the gov-
ernment] excludes all other individuals from its act, and on the other hand, it thereby 
constitutes itself a government that is a specific will, and so stands opposed to the uni-
versal will; consequently, it is absolutely impossible for it to exhibit itself as anything else 
but a faction’.84 so, we see that the possibility of faction is produced by, not the pragmatic 
demands of the revolution or the personalities involved, but by the logic of the world 
view that gives rise to the revolution in the first place. The mere concrete presence of 
some particularity, whether of decision or of act, constitutes a separation from the univer-
sal community and thereby a betrayal of the community’s claim to be the exclusive and 
only true product of what the individual most is.
unfortunately, all individuals are particular: each acts and lives in ways that are 
empirically unique, if only in the unavoidable sense that each occupies a time and place 
that others do not and cannot, and each must operate in the world according to the 
demands of that time and place (i.e., the complexities of existence). since the universal 
community can, by its very universality provide no criteria for distinguishing which un-
avoidable particularity ‘stands opposed to the universal will’ and which is an innocent 
feature of mere existence itself, ‘[b]eing suspected, therefore, takes the place, or has the sig-
nificance and effect, of being guilty’ of this opposition.85 for where objective facts have no 
meaning, only the will of the community does. and then it is the quality of the will that 
matters: being perceived as unreliable by the universal community becomes a greater 
consideration than any specific acts an individual might or might not have committed. 
here, then, the inability to distinguish between objective guilt and innocence lies 
not with the vagueness of the law (e.g., article V of the law of Prairial (1794)) or the in-
adequacies of the judicial proceedings.86 nor is the problem one of personality, rooted in 
robespierre’s ‘missionary zeal’ in ‘purging society of vice’.87 rather it is the logic of the 
world view which the law and judicial proceedings and individuals articulate. so, there 
would always be further challenges against which to defend, others who failed the test 
of a good citizen and who consequently had to be eliminated, not because of the objec-
tive fact of challenge or threat, but because all decision and doing, whatever its content 
is a particularization and therefore a separation from the community. so, arendt is cor-
rect when she notes that when ‘[t]error becomes total’, objective ‘[g]uilt and innocence 
become senseless notions’,88 but the two processes—totalizing violence and the loss of 
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the relevance of guilt and innocence—are underpinned by the same dynamic rooted in 
modernity’s first identity.
yet, to have explained why the logic of modernity’s birth contains within it a dynamic 
to violence that turns on itself as easily as it turns on the old world does not itself answer 
why the shape of this violence ‘consists in the cold, matter-of-fact annihilation’.89 from 
hegel’s account, we can reconstruct three reasons why the inner dynamic within moder-
nity’s founding has as its final destination, not just death, but death as public spectacle.
first, to be other than what the community articulates one truly is (in the case 
of the french revolution: a good citizen; but in other manifestations of this modern 
moment: a good comrade, a good Muslim, and so on), is to be guilty of separation from 
the universal community. But why is the suspected faction or individual warranting of 
violence in the first place, as opposed, e.g., to simply ignoring or excluding individuals 
from communal life? it is to challenge the world view at modernity’s birth in which the 
community alone articulates what is real and true. That is: to be other than the univer-
sal demands of the community require is to make one’s ‘mere being’ into an existential 
threat to the community. To be apart from the community (or to be suspected as being 
apart from the community—there is no distinction between these two states possible) is 
to become ‘a free object standing over against’ the community.90 This condition is an exis-
tential threat, not because the suspected individual or group needs to possess (or be re-
conceptualized as possessing) real power, but because the logic of modernity’s founding 
cannot allow the modern consciousness to abide by the meaningful existence of what 
is not a product of itself. To do so is to say that there is another truth present, one that is 
valid other than through and as the universal community. it is to say that the ‘complexi-
ties of existence’ do indeed matter.
second, within the logic of the world view that lies at modernity’s birth, the ‘guilt’ 
of separation of the community can only be extirpated through the cancellation of that 
separation. But if mere difference, bare particularity, sunders oneself from the commu-
nity then the bare existence of this particular body is the only ‘defect’ that can be cor-
rected. as hegel says ‘nothing else can be taken away but its mere being’.91 reeducation, 
imprisonment, and so on, do not and cannot alter the fact of existence, and therefore 
there is no conceptual possibility of using violence for anything other than death. since 
particularity is robbed of all meaning with modernity’s birth, death of the sundered in-
dividual can be ‘the cold, matter-of-fact annihilation of this existent self ’.92
Third, hegel points to a final necessity, not just for death being the true shape of 
violence at modernity’s founding, but for death assuming the shape of spectacle, of re-
quiring the publicity of violence. This spectacular nature of death is easily but mistakenly 
explained if we only see the application of mortal violence as a means. however, the 
question is not whether death as spectacle is possible to conceive before the principle of 
     89. hegel, Phg ¶ 591.
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subjectivity ‘ascends the throne of the world’93—Machiavelli notes it as a feature of the 
prudent politics in the early sixteenth century94—but whether it is possible to conceive 
an internal or necessary connection between modernity and death as ‘tremendous specta-
cle’. hegel implies just such a necessity when he notes that for the revolution, ‘[t]he sole 
work and deed of universal freedom is therefore death, a death too which has no inner 
significance or filling, for what is negated is the empty point of the absolutely free self. it 
is thus the coldest and meanest of all deaths, with no more significance than cutting off 
a head of cabbage or swallowing a mouthful of water’.95 if all decision and action by the 
government serves only to sunder government from the universal community (faction), 
or of individuals from the community (enemies of the people), or laws and institutions 
from the universal purpose because they benefit not the ‘general welfare’ but only these 
particular individuals and groups, and so on, then the universal community seemingly 
cannot ‘achieve anything positive, either universal works of language or of reality, either 
of laws and general institutions of conscious freedom, or of deeds and works of freedom 
that wills them’.96 
yet, at least, in removing what is sundered, the community is doing something that 
is an articulation of its being: the community tries to preserve its self-conception, its 
identity as that which alone is whole and universal. in this way, there is only one task 
authentically congruent with the pure logic of modernity at its birth: to annihilate what 
breaks loose from it, to destroy what stands guilty (i.e., suspected) of insisting on its self-
subsistence by the mere fact of the way that it is in the world. annihilation becomes the 
‘sole work’ of the revolution and of ontologically modern terrorism because it is the 
only deed that does not leave the residuum of particularity behind it. This deed is done 
as spectacle because only as spectacle, only by making death public, does death have 
the appearance of being a universal act that comes from the individual, and enacted on 
its behalf by the community.
Vi. cOnclusiOn
The role of philosophy and even of hegelian philosophy for the study of violence has 
been noted by the literature, but largely as source of influence, or perhaps an indi-
rect cause. While Karl Popper explores this idea in the broader context of the rise of 
totalitarianism,97 chaliand and Blin typify this approach within the study of modern 
terrorism. They suggest that the hegelian view of history had a profound effect through 
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its critical influence on Marx, which, in turn, would come to be one of the predominant 
features of nineteenth and twentieth century revolutionary violence. With the transfor-
mation of hegelian ideas of the passive, retrospective description of what is rational 
within what is—most infamously captured by hegel’s aphorism that ‘what is rational 
is the actual; and what is actual is rational’98—to a philosophy through history of class 
struggle and prospective revolutionary liberation of humanity to what will be, Marxism 
permitted ‘the opportunist implementation of a policy of terror’ by revolutionaries.99 
similarly, duyvesteyn argues, that the terrorism literature has under-stated the signifi-
cance of the role of ideas in favour of the more tangible aspects of modernization in the 
nineteenth century: ‘equally important or even more important was perhaps the rise 
of “liberation” ideologies from the ideas of the french revolution such as democracy, 
Marxism and nationalism, which were to have such a large effect on twentieth century 
history, including terrorist activity. in none of the sources [within the terrorism litera-
ture] these factors seem to receive the attention they can be argued to deserve’.100
however, as our argument also shows, to truly reclaim the importance of ideas for 
an understanding of modern terrorism requires more than simply reclaiming philosoph-
ical ideas as causal ‘factors’. it requires being able to show the inner dynamic, the immanent 
necessity, that moves from the ideas to the shape of terrorist violence itself, not the ‘op-
portunist implementation’ or justification for terrorist violence. To understand what is 
modern in modern terrorism is to understand how modernity generates not the playing 
field of material and ideational objects used by terrorism but, simultaneously, the game 
of terrorism itself. here, then, we have argued that a reconstruction of hegel’s account 
of the french revolution and its Terror does more than uncover a causal influence (e.g., 
by way of Marx), but a framework of analysis which reveals this inner dynamic between 
truly modern ideas and truly modern terrorism.
as we have shown, the shape of this inner dynamic is a uniquely modern self-con-
sciousness: a world view in which subjectivity, and the place of the individual will in the 
creation of the true world, is foundational. This hegelian insight does not supplant the 
emphasis on the specific ideological underpinnings of terrorism which, for instance, un-
dergird rapoport’s waves of terrorism or the emphasis on liberty and nationalism that 
otherwise brings the french revolution to the fore as a beginning of modernity and 
modern terrorism within the literature. nor does it displace the opportunities that vari-
ous communication and transportation technologies present for the instrumentalization 
of violence. rather, the identification of this more foundational comportment or under-
standing of self and world as the deep logic of modernity at its birth, provides the other-
wise inexplicable direction and internal coherence to certain shapes of terrorism—even 
as they are given particular outward appearances and trajectories by specific ideologies, 
technologies, and circumstances.
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By reconstructing how this subjective mode of self-consciousness gives rise to the re-
quirements of membership and then universal community, which then internally produc-
es ideational and physical violence culminating in ‘cold, matter-of-fact annihilation’,101 
the total and spectacular ‘fanaticism of destruction’,102 we have a way to bring unity and 
order to the study of terrorism that is uniquely modern. Where, as we have seen, the 
literature identifies but can agree upon neither the variety of features that characterize 
modern terrorism—e.g., indiscriminate objects of violence, the justifications and moti-
vations for the violence, the technologies instrumentalized, and so on—nor their rela-
tive importance, hegel’s account allows us to inquire into the unity of modern terrorism. 
for it provides those intellectual resources that reveal how these different features, inso-
far as they are indeed truly modern, emerge from a common, foundationally modern 
source: the world view of pure subjectivity. in this way, hegel’s account provides a way 
to settle disputes about where modernity and modern terrorism begins, by providing 
the criterion for determining how would know if one found its nature. can the factor 
identified itself explain, the shape and logic of the phenomenon as a whole, not merely 
the instruments by which that logic or nature plays itself out? if the answer is ‘yes’—as 
our reconstruction of the logic that moves from a unique modern identity to community 
to modalities of violence has shown—then that factor is primary, and the incidence of 
terror is an instance of modern terrorism. if the answer is ‘no’, then the factor is not pri-
mary, but may be an important intermediate variable which shapes outward features, 
not the inner dynamic.
The argument presented here, then, introduces the idea of an ontological concep-
tion of modern terrorism, not a temporal one. here, modern terrorism is modern, not 
because it occurs within the modern age, but because it is animated by the inner dy-
namic found at the birth of modernity itself. so, the modern age may contain varieties 
of terrorist movements and events which are not modern because they are animated 
by concerns that are simply utilitarian, i.e., choosing asymmetrical warfare as means to 
some other end, attentive to the complexities of existence and taking their bearings from 
them. in Machiavelli’s terms, some terrorism in the modern age may simply be ‘cruelty 
well used’. now, since modernity for hegel is born in one world view (subjectivity), but 
finds its completion and stability in another (ethicality), the moment of truly modern 
terrorism had, for hegel, but one necessary occurrence: the Terror of the french revolu-
tion. for hegel, after the Terror has run its course by showing to itself the impossibility 
of building on a new world animated by subjectivity alone a world view of late-moderni-
ty is ushered in by napoleon Bonaparte (‘this world-soul’ who, ‘astride a horse, reaches 
out over the world and masters it’)103 who reintroduces new ‘complexities of existence’—
a new institutional order that has an independent existence—which now can accom-
     101. hegel, Phg ¶ 591.
     102. hegel, Pr § 5 remark [p. 38].
     103. letter from hegel to friedrich niethammer, 13 October 1806. g.W.f. hegel, Hegel: The Letters, trans. 
clark Butler and christiane seiler, Bloomington, indiana university Press, 1984, Briefe 74. reference is to 
numbered correspondence in g.W.f. hegel, Briefe von und an Hegel,  Johannes hoffmeister (ed.), hamburg, 
felix Meiner Verlag, 1969.
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modate subjectivity, without surrendering the world to it. in this way, contemporary ter-
rorism that is truly modern terrorism is atavistic. it is not a rejection or reaction against 
modernity, but, ironically, a reenactment of the birth moment of modernity, a reactivation 
of pure subjectivity in a world that has already moved beyond it.
gavin cameron 
 university of calgary 
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